Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation (PVC) allows devices with restricted resources to delegate computations to more powerful external servers, and to verify the correctness of results. Whilst beneficial in many situations, this increases the visibility and availability of potentially sensitive data, so we may wish to limit the sets of entities that can view input data and results. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that all users have identical and uncontrolled access to all functionality within an organization. Thus there is a need for access control mechanisms in PVC environments.
INTRODUCTION
The increasing use of mobile devices as general computing devices, "big data" and cloud computing results in a growing discrepancy between the resources of end-users and those required for computational tasks. As a result, client devices need to be able to efficiently delegate computations to a server and verify the correctness of results. This is known as Verifiable Outsourced Computation (VC) [13, 15, 7] .
Recent work has proposed extensions to VC where there exist large pools of delegators, known as Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation (PVC) [15] , and servers [3] . As with any multi-user setting, we may wish to control access to resources. In this paper, we show that not only is this setting of multi-user VC well-suited to the cryptographic en-forcement of access control policies, but that such policies fulfil a natural and vital role in protecting outsourced computations. Specifically in the setting of multi-user VC, we may wish to (i) restrict the computations that may be outsourced by delegators; and (ii) restrict the computations a server may perform. The first need stems from separation of duties and the observation that, within an organization, it is extremely unlikely that all users have equal, uncontrolled access to all functionality. We may restrict the set of delegators that may outsource a computation to those that are authorized internally to compute it (if given sufficient resources). The second requirement arises, for example, from servers being selected from the pool for a particular job without the delegator necessarily having prior knowledge. Thus delegators may not authenticate the server beforehand (in contrast with prior schemes where a single server was chosen with which to set up a VC system) and have less control over which servers may process their data. The sensitivity of the data or other requirements, such as the physical location or resources of the server, may limit the servers that should be permitted to perform the computation.
Some VC settings distinguish between delegators and verifiers [3] . Delegators (or distinguished verifiers) may learn the result of the computation, whereas standard verifiers may only confirm that the result was computed correctly. Again, in a multi-user VC setting, we may wish to restrict the users that: (i) verify the result; and (ii) learn the result. When operating on sensitive data, this second restriction ensures that read access to the generated results is limited to those that satisfy the access control policy e.g. only entities that may read the input data may read the output.
A third motivation for access control in the VC setting is that computational services may be charged for (e.g. in subscription-based utility computing [14, 16] ) and that service providers may offer different levels of service to different clients (e.g. different levels may provide access to different functions or computational resources). We must ensure that only valid subscribers may access each tier of service.
In many multi-user settings, access control is enforced by trusted software which authenticates users and evaluates authorization policies [6, 17] . This reference monitor is not appropriate in the multi-user VC setting since the servers are assumed to be untrusted and may have a vested interest in violating the policies. We instead use a cryptographic enforcement mechanism for access control policies where cryptographic keys are used to protect objects and restrict access -the access control mechanism reduces to the appropriate distribution of keys to authorized entities. We use the trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC) introduced in the Revocable Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation model (RPVC) [3] and extend its duties to instantiate the access control mechanism. In RPVC, the KDC issued keys that enable the delegation and evaluation of particular functions; we additionally require it to issue keys appropriate to the access control policy that enables read and write access to certain components of the PVC system.
Note that in an RPVC scheme, the KDC implicitly provides some access control in that servers are certified to perform specific functions through the generation of evaluation keys. However, no access control is applied to delegatorsany entity can outsource an evaluation of any function for which the KDC has published delegation information. In particular, a delegator may request a computation that the delegator itself is not authorized to perform.
Cryptographic enforcement mechanisms are particularly appropriate when the objects and policies are relatively static (such that additional keys need not be generated and objects need not be re-encrypted). In the context of VC, we may assume that the set of functions that may be evaluated is fixed (a given VC construction can implement a specified family of functions) and that the input data to each function is also static (limited to the set of 'valid' inputs to that function). Thus, the set of objects (function evaluations in VC) is static, and policies will primarily be specified in terms of these computations. Thus multi-user VC is a very natural setting in which to use cryptographic access control. However, VC leads to a somewhat novel application of these mechanisms as we will illustrate in Section 3.
Related work. Clear et al. [8] considered policies over delegators only and in a non-verifiable, multi-input outsourced computation setting using homomorphic Ciphertext-Policy ABE and fully homomorphic encryption. In independent and concurrent work, Xu et al. [18] also addressed the necessity for access control in the setting of verifiable computation, but limited their scope to non-public verifiable computation (i.e. not the full multi-user setting) enforcing access control on delegators only. Xu et al. discuss their notion purely in terms of using CP-ABE as the enforcement mechanism and did not discuss the form of the policies; in contrast, we discuss in detail the types of policies that are of interest in terms of generic graph-based access control policies. These may be enforced by a variety of enforcement mechanisms, including symmetric KASs as used here (which may well be more efficient than the pairing-based CP-ABE approach). We believe that we present a more generic treatment which, importantly, extends to the multi-user PVC setting and incorporates a more natural view of hierarchical access control, as well as additional security notions.
BACKGROUND

Revocable PVC
Non-interactive verifiable computation (VC) [13] is a protocol between two probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) parties, a client C and a server S, which results in the provably correct computation of F (x) by the server for an input x given by the client. Parno et al. [15] Figure 2 : The operation of PVC-AC and servers exist and jobs may be submitted to the pool. This model includes a trusted entity known as a Key Distribution Center (KDC) to perform costly set-up operations and issue appropriate keys. RPVC comprises the algorithms Setup, FnInit, Register, Certify, ProbGen, Compute, BVerif, Retrieve and Revoke illustrated in Figure 1 and corresponding to the following:
1. The KDC generates public parameters, issues personalised secret keys, and evaluation keys to servers and publishes function delegation information.
2. To outsource the evaluation of F (x), a delegator C, sends an encoded input σo to a server S, and publishes a verification token and output retrieval key.
3. S uses σo and an evaluation key for F to produce an encoded output.
4. Any entity can use the verification token to verify correctness without learning the value of F (x) unless in possession of a retrieval key (blind verification). If S cheated they may report S to the KDC for revocation.
5. If blind verification was successful, a party possessing the output retrieval key can recover F (x).
6. The KDC may revoke a cheating server to prevent it from performing computations (and hence from receiving any reward for future work).
Cryptographic Enforcement of Access Control Policies
Graph-based Access Control.
A partially ordered set (poset) is a set L equipped with a reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive binary relation . We may write x < y if x y and x = y, and write y x if x y. We say that x covers y, written y x, if y < x and no z exists in L such that y < z < x. The Hasse Diagram of a poset (L, ) is the directed acyclic graph H = (L, ) where vertices are labelled by the elements of L and an edge connects vertex v to w if and only if w v. Let U be a set of entities, O be a set of resources to be protected, and (L, ) be a poset of security labels. Let λ : U ∪ O → L be a labelling function assigning a security label to each entity and object. The tuple (L, , U, O, λ) then denotes an information flow policy which can be represented by the H. Henceforth we refer to such policies as graph-based access control policies. The policy requires that information flow from objects to entities preserves the partial ordering relation -an entity u ∈ U may read an object o ∈ O if and only if λ(u) λ(o) i.e. there exists a directed path from λ(u) to λ(o) in H. The forward implication forms the correctness criterion, whilst the reverse forms the security criterion. Note that this statement is the simple security property of the Bell-LaPadula security model [5] . Thus an entity assigned clearance label x is prevented from accessing objects classified with label y if y x.
Key Assignment Schemes.
A Key Assignment Scheme (KAS) [1] provides a generic, cryptographic enforcement mechanism for such policies where a unique cryptographic key κx is associated to each node x (security label) in H. A KAS eases the problem of key distribution by allowing a trusted center to distribute a single key to each entity, who may combine this key with public information to derive additional keys for which the user is authorized. A well-known KAS construction (known as an iterative key encrypting (IKE) KAS [10] ) publishes encrypted keys. In particular, for each y < x, such that no z exists with y < z < x, Encrypt κx (κy) is published. Then for any x > y, the key for each node on a path from x to y can be derived (in an iterative fashion) if κx is known. Key indistinguishability (KI) [4] is a crucial security property if derived keys are used in other protocols: given a set of keys κx 1 , . . . , κx n , an adversary should be unable to distinguish between the key for a challenge node x (not a descendent of any xi) and a randomly chosen key. Freire et al. [12] introduced Strong Key Indistinguishability (S-KI) which provides access to keys associated to all other classes which are predecessors of the target class in the hierarchy.
POLICIES
We consider graph-based policies in the context of multiuser verifiable outsourced computation where "objects" to be protected are not data files, as in traditional access control policies, but outsourced computations and their results. The "user" population comprises the sets of delegators C, computational servers S, and verifiers V. We are interested in specifying and enforcing policies that restrict: (i) which functions a delegator may delegate; (ii) which functions a server may evaluate; (iii) which outputs a verifier may read.
There has been considerable research in recent years on the cryptographic enforcement of access control policies [10, 11, 1] . Informally, access is regulated in a distributed fashion by issuing appropriate cryptographic keys to authorized subjects, rather than a centralized reference monitor mediating all attempts to access protected resources. Cryptographic access control generally focuses on read access and is particularly appropriate when the protected content is read often but written rarely (to reduce re-encryption). In the context of VC, we will use cryptographic access control in somewhat unusual ways. Rather than storing static encrypted data and ensuring that only authorized users hold the relevant decryption key, we will encrypt dynamic messages within a protocol execution. In particular, to enforce policies restricting the computations that may be outsourced, a delegator must use an appropriate key to encrypt input data. Without the appropriate encryption, the input will be discarded by the server. The enforcement of policies for performing computations is achieved by distributing keys to servers that can be used to decrypt encrypted inputs. The enforcement of (read) policies on outputs uses cryptographic access control in a more conventional fashion; results are published and protected via encryption with an appropriate key.
Cryptographic access control has been particularly widely studied in the context of information flow and graph-based access control policies (see Section 2.2). We restrict our focus to graph-based policies as these encompass many notions of access control that are desirable in practice including information flow policies, role-based and attribute-based access control [9] . Recall that we define "user" population as the sets of delegators C, computational servers S, and verifiers V. We define a security function λ :
where O is the family of computations that may be outsourced and (L, ) is a poset of security labels. This function assigns a label from L, representing the security classification, to each delegator, server and computation in the PVC-AC system. We differentiate between computation policies over delegators and servers, denoted λ C (·), and verification policies over delegators and verifiers, denoted λ V (·). For ease of notation, we use λ to denote λ C in Section 3. A discussion of verification policies appears in the online version of this paper [2] .
Policies over Functions.
We begin by considering a simple case where policies are formulated purely in terms of the functions being computed. In simple terms, we associate each delegator C and server S with a set of functions λ(C) ⊆ F and λ(S) ⊆ F respectively. More formally, we define the set of security labels L to be 2 F (the power set of all considered functions). Then, λ(C) ⊆ F defines the set of functions that a delegator C may outsource an evaluation of, λ(S) ⊆ F denotes the functions a server S may compute and for a computation o ∈ O computing a function F ∈ F, λ(o) = {F }. Then, for any x, y ∈ L we define an order relation: x < y if and only if x ∈ F, y ⊆ F and x ∈ y. The corresponding Hasse diagram with F = {F, G, H} is shown in Figure 3a .
1 Any entity E authorized for λ(E) is, by the correctness criterion, authorized to operate on all computations such that λ(o) < λ(E). For example, in Figure 3a , an entity authorised for the set λ(E) = {F, G} is authorized for the functions F and G as expected. Each label l ∈ L will be associated with a key κ l . To outsource a computation o of F (x), C prepares the encoding of x using the key κo = {F } which, by the security criterion, C knows if and only if λ(C) λ(o) i.e. if and only if {F } ∈ λ(C). To compute F (x), S uses the corresponding key κo. As before, S may do this if and only if {F } ∈ λ(S).
Policies over Function Inputs.
As well as limiting the functions that may be outsourced, we may wish to implement a more fine-grained access control policy determined by input values to functions. For ease of We then redefine the security function such that "objects" are now considered to be pairs (F, x) where F ∈ F and
n . To define the order relation on L we must first define an ordering on the input data. One choice is to define a co-ordinatewise ordering on {0, 1} n : that is (x1, . . . , xn) (y1, . . . , yn) if and only if xi yi for all i. Then for two labels (G, x) and (G , x ) in L, (G, x) (G , x ) if and only if G = {F } for some F ∈ F, F ∈ G and x x . This poset could be used to ensure delegators and servers operate over a limited range of data values. Specifically, for an entity E, we define λ(E) = (G, x), where G ⊆ F and x ∈ {0, 1} n , and λ(o) = ({F }, 0 n ). Then E is authorized to operate on G(y) for all G ∈ G and all y x. The Hasse diagram for this poset with F = {F, G} and n = 2 is shown in Figure 3b . Different choice of orderings over inputs lead to different restrictions e.g. one could consider bit strings as integers and use the natural ordering over integers for x ≤ y.
An alternative would be to let L be the power set 2
n . Then each function may be associated with a different range of permissible inputs. An entity E, is labelled by a set of pairs of a function label and an associated input label -λ(E) = { (F1, x1) , . . . , (Fm, xm)}. A computation of F (x) is labelled λ(o) = ({F }, x). Then, for any two labels, { (F1, x1) , . . . , (Fm, xm)} { (F 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , (F m , x m )} if and only if m = 1 (the first label is a single pair), F1 = F i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , m } and x1 x i .
The first choice of poset in this section corresponds to assigning a possible data range to each delegator and then authorizing them to outsource a set of functions on that data e.g. a chinese wall policy restricting access to separate portions of a database. Then, depending on the employee's role, they are permitted to evaluate a specific set of functions on that data partition. The second choice of poset is more akin to authorizing delegators to outsource a single, specified computation e.g. permitting the entity to evaluate F (x) for only this choice of function and input data. Finally, the choice of L = 2 F × 2
{0,1}
n allows each function to be 2 If not, define n = maxF ∈F |Dom(F )| and redefine all functions F with Dom(F ) < n by adding fixed points F (x) = x for all x ∈ {0, 1} n \ Dom(F ).
associated with arbitrary sets of input values.
Enforcing General Graph-based Policies.
We have seen how sets of functions and inputs can be mapped to a graph-based access control policy to restrict the functions a delegator may outsource and a server may compute. However, in practical applications, outsourced computation functionality will be required to integrate with existing workflows and existing access control policies. As an example, a company that operates Role-based Access Control (RBAC) on their local network and wishes to provide access to an external VC system must ensure that the same access control requirements are adhered to within this new environment. Additionally, a computation may not always be considered purely in terms of the function and input data. Indeed, although the evaluation will be uniquely determined by such factors, the level of protection required may depend on other contextual information. As a motivating example, consider a summation function over the integers. The semantic meaning of the integers may determine the overall classification of this computation -if the integers are city populations then this may not be classified at all, but troop deployments in different regions are much more sensitive.
We can use any poset of security labels L to classify outsourced computations. For example, consider the total order M = {TS, S, C, U} representing the Bell-LaPadula clearance levels [5] and let K to be a set of need-to-know categories. Then we can enforce the security function λ :
K where K specifies the nature, and M specifies the sensitivity, of the computation o ∈ O. To delegate or compute F (x), we require that the entity E's clearance level is at least the classification of the computation: λ(E) λ(o). Similarly, one could define L to be a poset of RBAC roles [9] to integrate with existing RBAC policies.
Additional criteria could be added to the mapping to security labels. For example, we could formulate time-dependant policies by setting λ : C ∪S ∪(F ×T ) → L, where T is a set of time periods. We could then set L = 2 F ×T as in the previous section to allow entities to operate on specific functions only during specified time periods. By defining L = M as above, certain functions can be more highly protected during certain times of the day. Finally, policies over function inputs can be extended to include characteristics of the input data. Let Z be a set of labels describing data types that functions may be computed over, and define L = 2 F ×({0,1} n ×Z) . This enables the same input to the same function to be classified differently and hence to require different authorization.
One interesting setting for multi-user VC is when users pay for computation-as-a-service [14, 16] . If users pay a price per computation, they could be issued a relevant key such as those discussed in Section 3, with a short time window in which to perform the computation. This key is used when outsourcing a computation to prove that the user has paid for this computation. Alternatively, servers may provide subscriptions to different tiers of service [14] . For example, subscription to a Gold tier may allow access to more computational resources, or access during busier periods, than Silver, and so on. For simplicity, suppose the resources to be considered are just RAM capacity and the number of processor cores available, and let R and C be sets comprising the available quantities of each. Then, the set of security labels L is set to be L = R × C -that is, the cartesian product of the available resources. A user that pays for Gold membership can be assigned the label λ(C) = {(32GB, 32core)} for example and each computation is labelled by the resources that it requires. The poset ordering over L allows each tier to access different subsets of resources as in Figure 3c .
PVC WITH ACCESS CONTROL
We define the notion of PVC-AC to enforce graph-based access control policies over delegators, servers and verifiers. Recall that the set of outsourced computations is denoted by O. A specific element o ∈ O consists of the function F , an input x in the domain of F , as well as some auxiliary input. Finally, PC and PV denote posets encoding the computation and verification policies respectively. Definition 1. A Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation Scheme with Access Control (PVC-AC) comprises:
Run by the KDC.
• P KF ← FnInit(F, MK, PP): Run by the KDC to generate a delegation key, P KF , for a function F .
• SKID ← Register(ID, λ(ID), MK, PP): Run by the KDC to create a key for an entity with identifier 3 ID.
• EKF,S ← Certify(S, F, MK, PP): The KDC creates an evaluation key EKF,S for a function F and server S.
• (σo, V Ko, RKo) ← ProbGen(x, SKC , P KF , λ(C), λ(o), PP): Run by an authorized delegator C to outsource the computation of F (x).
• θo ← Compute(σo, EKF,S, SKS, λ C (S), λ C (o), P P ): Run by a server S to evaluate F (x) and output an encoding, θo, of the result.
• (ỹ, τ θo ) ← Verify(θo, SKV , V Ko, λ V (V ), λ V (o), PP): Verification comprises two steps:
-(RTo, τ θo ) ← BVerif(PP, θo, V Ko): Run by any verifier to check correctness of the result.
-ỹ ← Retrieve(SKV , RTo, τ θo , V Ko, RKo, λ V (V ), λ V (o), PP): Run by verifiers V holding the output retrieval key RKo to read the value of F (x).
• {EK F,S } or ⊥ ← Revoke(τ θo , F, MK, PP): Run by the KDC to revoke a server reported as misbehaving. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . A PVC-AC scheme is correct if for all functions F ∈ F , inputs x, honestly generated parameters, and honestly registered entities C, S and V such that λ
, if S honestly runs Compute for F on an encoding of x generated by C, then V running Verify on the output will almost certainly output accept and F (x).
SECURITY NOTIONS
We now introduce several security models capturing requirements of PVC-AC. Due to space constraints, in this section we will briefly and informally introduce each security notion. Full descriptions and formal security definitions are available in the full version of this paper [2] .
• Authorized Outsourcing: a delegator may not outsource any computation for which he is not authorized -that is, a computation o where λ C (o) λ C (C).
• Authorized Computation: a result should only be considered valid if generated by an authorized partythat is, a server S where λ C (S) λ C (o).
• Authorized Verification: a verifier may not learn the output of a computation for which he is not authorized -that is, a computation o where
• Weak Input Privacy: a server (or other entity) may not learn the input data for computations they are not authorized to perform -that is, computations o where λ C (o) λ C (S).
INSTANTIATION
We give a provably secure example instantiation of PVC-AC in the full version of this paper [2] . Informally, the graphbased policies discussed in Section 3 assign labels to each entity and outsourced computation. The ordering relation and the correctness criterion ensures that entities are authorized for all appropriate computations (those that are descendants of their label in the Hasse diagram of the poset). A KAS is designed to enforce such policies, and assigns a key to each label. Each entity is provided with a key corresponding to their label, and they may derive keys for all descendants. As per the security criterion, users may not collude to derive keys for which they are not authorized.
In our setting, we restrict the computations a delegator may outsource, the computations a server may perform, and the results a verifier may learn. We use two independent KASs instantiated over the computation and verification posets, PC and PV respectively. Delegators and servers are issued a key according to their respective labels in the computation poset, while delegators and verifiers are given a key from the verification KAS. Appropriate keys from the computation KAS are used to encrypt the encoded input for a computation. To encode an input in a manner that will be accepted by a server, delegators must encrypt the encoded input using the key, κ λ C (o) , associated to the computation within the computation poset. To do so, the delegator must be able to derive κ λ C (o) and hence must hold a key at that level or higher i.e. λ(C) λ(o) -delegators must be authorized by the KDC to outsource the computation. Similarly, only authorized servers can derive the decryption key to access the encoded input and perform the computation. By the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme used, no information about the encoded input is learnt by an unauthorized entity. To enforce verification policies, delegators generate a retrieval key during delegation, and encrypt this using an appropriate key from the verification KAS. Only verifiers that can derive this key may decrypt the ciphertext to recover the retrieval key and learn the output. Theorem 1. Given a Strong-Key-Indistinguishability secure KAS, a RPVC scheme secure in the sense of Public Verifiability, Revocation, and Blind Verification, and an symmetric authenticated encryption scheme secure in the sense of IND-CPA∧INT-PTXT, then the PVC-AC scheme defined in Algorithms 1-9 is secure in the sense of Public Verifiability, Revocation, Blind Verification, Authorized Outsourcing, Authorized Computation, Weak Input Privacy, and Authorized Verification.
Informally, the security proofs follow from the security of the underlying RPVC scheme and the S-KI and IND-CPA∧ INT-PTXT security properties. The full proofs of security can be found in the full version of the paper [2] .
CONCLUSION
We have motivated the need for the cryptographic enforcement of access control policies in the setting of outsourced computation, particularly in the multi-user setting. As developments in VC continue towards such settings, it is vital to enable restrictions to be placed on: the computations that delegators can outsource (both from the perspective of separation of duties, and considering a server providing differing levels of service for different users); the computations a server may perform (such that certain computations, over sensitive data say, may only be performed by a server satisfying a policy); and the verifiers that may learn the output of the result (e.g. ensuring that read access to the newly generated data is handled consistently with the sensitivity of the inputs). We have shown example graph-based access control policies for these scenarios, as well as providing a formal definitional framework, security models, and a provably secure construction built from Key Assignment Schemes.
